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PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: 
OPPOSING LAKESHORE FUNNEL DEVELOPMENT 
Daniel G. Kagan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The battle for Golden Pond is on. The traditional lakeshore sum-
mer cottage owner and the multiunit real estate developer are com-
peting for control over the country's prime inland recreational 
waters. 1 The summer cottage owner wants to maintain the lake as 
a peaceful retreat for boating, fishing, and swimming by day and 
listening to the loons by night in relative privacy. The developer 
sees available lakefront real estate as an opportunity to profit from 
the enormous demand for vacation property.2 A high density, mul-
tiunit funnel development3 allows many more purchasers to buy 
homes with lake access than does a development of single family 
units. Large-scale development and recreational use, however, can 
interfere with the existing cottage owner's enjoyment of the lake as 
well as threaten the lake's idyllic, healthy state. Accordingly, the 
developer's interest in turning a profit is at odds with the existing 
riparian owners' desire to maintain the status quo. 
To maximize marketing position, developers stress access to the 
lake's crystal clear waters for each purchaser's recreational use as 
* Editor in Chief, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Kusler, Carrying Controls for Recreational Water Uses, 1973 WIse. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter 
Kusler, Carrying Controls]. Lakes, the principle inland recreational waters, are concentrated 
largely in a northern bank of glaciated states including Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, 
and Washington. This relatively fixed supply must meet skyrocketing water oriented recrea-
tion demands. Id. 
2 Resort Home Prices Soaring in Northeast, Portland, Maine, Press Herald, July 28, 1986, 
at 17, col. 7. 
3 See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. 
105 
106 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:105 
an integral part of the development package. 4 However, with lake-
shore frontage in increasingly short supply and commanding lofty 
prices, developers rarely can provide each purchaser with a water-
front lot. 5 Instead, the developer maximizes profits by building multi-
family units on a large, relatively inexpensive tract of nonriparian 
land and providing each owner with water access through a small 
parcel of riparian land. 6 This type of project is known as "funnel 
development," because large numbers of nonriparian owners are 
funneled to the lake through a riparian parcel of limited size. 7 
Funnel development projects are not new. Disputes relating to 
these projects have been before the courts since the 1960'S,8 and 
several commentators have addressed the issue. 9 The effects such 
development can have on lakes are known. 1o Although some lakes 
are more capable than others of sustaining recreational use and 
development, no lake can withstand indiscriminate overuse. 11 States 
recognize that introducing high density development to a lake can 
cause significant deleterious effects to the lake's quality. 12 
Generally, zoning and land use regulations restrict lakeside de-
velopment, and riparian owners can seek common law relief based 
on the reasonable use13 and private nuisance14 doctrines. However, 
these avenues are not always sufficient to limit development. Zoning 
laws are often ineffective or nonexistent. 15 Individual cottage owners 
may not have the means to pursue litigation, and courts may hesitate 
to preserve a cottage owner's semiprivate enjoyment of a . lake by 
restricting development that would increase lake access. 16 
4 See Bartke & Patton, Water Based Recreational Developments in Michigan-Problems of 
Developers, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1979). 
SId. 
6Id. 
7 See id. at 1039. 
8 See, e.g., Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967). 
9 See Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1005; Note, Riparian Water Law-Lakeshore 
Developments, 1966 WISC. L. REV. 172. 
10 See infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text. 
11 NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, 2 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT 
1984-1985, at 28 (May 1985) [hereinafter LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT]. 
12 Maine Times, December 19, 1986, at 12A, col. 1. Officials in Maine have categorized that 
state's lakes to determine those lakes that the state should protect and those that can best 
withstand further development. Numerous factors determine lake quality, including but not 
limited to aquatic and other wildlife, scenery, physical features such as caves and waterfalls, 
shoreline, accessibility, water volume, and rate of turnover. I d. 
13 See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 49-78 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text. 
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This Comment suggests another common law doctrine that a ri-
parian owner can raise in opposition to funnel development. In states 
where lakes are owned by the public and held in trust by the state, 
members of the public may sue the state under the public trust 
doctrine for violating the trust. By allowing developers to overbur-
den a public lake with excessive development, the state has allowed 
a small minority to profit at the expense of the state-held trust. As 
an alternative to suing developers for interfering with private ripar-
ian rights, lakeshore cottage owners can sue the state under the 
public trust doctrine to preserve an invaluable public resource from 
irreparable damage caused by overdevelopment. Accordingly, 
through the public trust doctrine, cottage owners become defenders 
of the public's interest in environmental conservation, rather than 
self-serving elitists interested only in keeping others off "their" lake. 
The public trust doctrine is still developing, and cases applying 
the doctrine in opposition to funnel development have not been 
reported. This Comment discusses why the public trust doctrine is 
a valid legal basis for opposing a developer's plans for funnel devel-
opment. Section II discusses why funnel development can be a par-
ticularly attractive method for developers to capitalize on the in-
creasing demand for shorefront property. Section II also addresses 
the various problems funnel development projects can cause. Section 
III addresses shortcomings in the zoning and land use regulatory 
process, and explains why zoning and land use ordinances do not 
protect lakes sufficiently in all cases. Section IV discusses the nuis-
ance and reasonable use doctrines, and the problems with applying 
these doctrines as remedies to funnel development. Section V intro-
duces the public trust doctrine and discusses how it applies to funnel 
development. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts should 
permit riparian owners to bring suit based on the public trust doc-
trine in opposition to funnel development. 
II. FUNNEL DEVELOPMENT AND THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR 
LAKESHORE PROPERTY 
The demand for vacation property in general, and property with 
recreational water access in particular, is skyrocketing. 17 Several 
factors appear to drive this demand. First, the overall strength of 
the economy and low mortgage rates have bolstered the real estate 
market generally, and increasing numbers of two income families 
17 Resort Home Prices Soaring in Northeast, supra note 2. 
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are looking to buy attractive properties as an investment. 18 A second 
factor that fuels demand for lakeshore property is that for many 
people who participate in water-based recreational activities, owning 
waterfront property is the only feasible way of assuring access to a 
lake. 19 Aesthetic considerations also fuel this increasing demand for 
waterfront vacation property, as many buyers seek to escape to the 
beauty, peace, and solitude that a lakeside residence can provide. 20 
The fixed supply of property with water frontage increases the 
pressures that this dynamic demand for waterfront property cre-
ates. 21 Where strong demand meets fixed supply, the pressure man-
ifests itself in higher prices. 22 Accordingly, prices for vacation prop-
erties along northern New England's lakes and seashores are 
soaring, with increases ranging from a low of ten percent to a high 
of fifty percent or more annually, in the most desirable waterfront 
areas. 23 Fewer potential buyers can afford the high cost of single 
unit, horizontal structures on waterfront lots. 24 Furthermore, de-
creasing availability of waterfront property limits the opportunities 
for developers searching for suitable development property. 25 
Funnel development has been a logical response to this problem. 
Because lake access is so desirable, developers maximize their return 
from lakeside property by providing water access to each purchaser 
of a nonriparian parcel. Such development projects "funnel" a large 
number of backlot unit owners to the shoreline through a relatively 
small parcel of riparian land. Developers can afford to construct 
multiunit funnel development projects on land that they could not 
develop economically with single-family homes, because they can 
18 Melissa Shackleton, Boston Office of Sotheby International'Real Estate, quoted in Resort 
Home Prices Soaring in Northeast, supra note 2. 
19 As property around lakes is privately developed, public access to many lakes becomes 
increasingly scarce. Canobie Lake Shores Not for General Public, Boston Globe, November 
9, 1986, at 83, col. 7. States are becoming aware of this problem and embarking on ambitious 
programs to acquire lakeside property for public access. Id. 
20 See LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT 1984-1985, supra note 11, at 20. 
21 As Will Rogers is commonly believed to have said, "Buy land. They don't make any more 
of it." This quotation is inaccurate, however. The actual quotation is "I have been putting 
what little money 1 have in ocean frontage for the sole reason that there was only so much of 
it and no more, and they [sic) wasn't making any more." B. STERLING, THE BEST OF WILL 
ROGERS 230 (1979). 
22 See Changes Are Coming in the Maine Condominium Market, 8 Real Estate Update 
(Maine), November, 1986, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Maine Condominium Market). 
23 Resort Home Prices Soaring in Northeast, supra note 2; The Land Rush is On, Maine 
Sunday Telegram, November 9, 1986, at 1, col. 2. 
24 Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1007. 
25Id. 
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divide land acquisition costs among all the purchasers in the proj-
ect.26 Units in funnel development projects are particularly attrac-
tive to purchasers who otherwise could not afford a home that in-
cludes water access. Developers provide this water access through 
various structuring schemes, including easements, leases, condomi-
niums, and cooperatives, as well as giving outright deeds of "mini-
fee simple" ownership of riparian land. 27 
Funnel development projects can, however, have a serious adverse 
impact on lakes. A funnel development allows intensified recreational 
use that can hurt both the lake's aesthetic qualities and its fragile 
ecosystem. As recreational use approaches the lake's carrying ca-
pacity, conflicts among users develop.28 For example, a relatively 
uncrowded lake can accommodate fishermen, swimmers, and water 
skiers simultaneously, but as the lake reaches its carrying capacity, 
each type of activity affects adversely enjoyment of another.29 Thus, 
the fisherman obstructs the water skier by reducing the surface area 
available for skiing, while the skier interferes with the fisherman by 
disturbing the fish. 30 The net result of such intensified use is a 
reduction in the quality of the lake for both recreationaPl and aes-
thetic enjoyment. 32 
Another problem with funnel development is that it imposes a 
"fourth neighbor" upon abutting riparian owners. The "fourth neigh-
bor" is the boater or swimmer who uses the water in front of anoth-
26Id. 
27Id. at 1040. The term "mini-fee simple" describes one form of lakeshore access right a 
developer may provide in a funnel development project. Id. The developer conveys to each 
backlot purchaser a token amount of riparian land that is sufficient to give the purchaser full 
riparian rights. Id. This technique allows backlot owners to "enjoy the permanency and 
benefits of fee ownership of riparian property." Id. For an exhaustive discussion of various 
means of creating funnel developments, see id. at 1038-60. 
28 Kusler, Carrying Controls, supra note 1, at 5. Carrying capacity refers to the optimum 
number of people using the lake for recreation at anyone time. Factors include the size, 
shape, and depth of the lake and the type of use contemplated. Id. at 5-7. 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 Id. 
31 In Silver Blue Lake Apartments v. Silver Lake Home Owner's Ass'n, the court cited the 
plaintiff's complaint that "the use of the lake by the tenants of the apartments creates such 
congestion on the lake that others can no longer enjoy boating on the lake in safety. In fact, 
at least one of the homeowners testified that his family now usually went elsewhere to go 
boating because of the congestion and unsafe condition at Silver Blue Lake." 225 So.2d 557, 
559-60 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 245 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1971). 
32 The New Hampshire Office of State Planning prepared a report that addressed how New 
Hampshire lakeshore owners use and enjoy New Hampshire's lakes. LAKES AND GREAT 
PONDS REPORT, supra note 1l. The report stated that lakeshore owners rank aesthetics, 
peace, and solitude as their primary concerns. Id. at 20. 
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er's property.33 This problem is most often associated with funnel 
development because where many people use a narrow stretch of 
shoreline, they tend to "fan out" into the semipublic spaces of the 
neighboring shore owners to swim and boat. 34 Shore owners regard 
their shoreline and the area in front of their property as their own, 
and resent another's use of this semiprivate space. 35 An abutting 
owner's riparian rights are thus affected particularly by funnel de-
velopment, and these abutting owners are especially likely to oppose 
such a project. 
More important than affecting other riparian owner's recreational 
use and enjoyment of a lake, funnel development can deteriorate the 
lake's water quality. For example, funnel development projects can 
introduce pollutants to a lake. 36 Indirect pollution occurs incidentally 
to a variety of land uses such as residential development and may 
present a serious problem. 37 Drainage and runoff systems for sub-
division roads and parking lots carry a wide variety of chemicals, 
nutrients and debris into storm water drainage channels and even-
tually into the lake. 38 Furthermore, substances dissolved in ground 
water can migrate long distances. 39 Pollutants such as pesticides and 
fertilizers are common to leisure home communities and present 
hazards to the lake, even when used some distance from the shore. 40 
In addition, excessive use of a lake by motorboats can cause eu-
trophication, particularly in lakes that turn over naturally at a slow 
rate. 41 Eutrophication occurs when oxygen-c.onsuming algae blooms 
accumulate in a lake. 42 Eutrophication injures much of the fish pop-
33 The term "fourth neighbor" arises from the presence of persons using the water in front 
of a lakeshore cottage. Neighbors one, two, and three are those abutters to the left, behind, 
and to the right of the cottage; the "fourth neighbor" is one who intrudes on the cottage's 
privacy from the water, that is, the fourth side. Hello, Fourth Neighbor, Maine Times, July 
19, 1985, at 10, col. 3. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See Kusler, Water Quality Protection for Inland Lakes in Wisconsin: A Comprehensive 
Approach to Water Pollution, 1970 WIse. L. REV. 35, 42-43 [hereinafter, Kusler, Wisconsin 
Lakes]. 
37 Id.; Lawn Lovers Win, Lose, Maine Times, June 12, 1987, at 12, col. 1. 
38 Id. at 43; Hello, Fourth Neighbor, supra note 33. 
39 Kusler, Wisconsin Lakes, supra note 36, at 44. 
40 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 20. 
41 A lake's natural turnover rate refers to the time it takes for incoming water to completely 
replace water lost from the lake through drainage and evaporation. A high turnover rate aids 
in flushing the lake of contaminants, while a low turnover rate means that contaminants are 
more likely to accumulate in the lake. A higher turnover rate diminishes eutrophication. See 
Comment, South Dakota's Lakes: A Valuable Resource in Need of Land Use Protection, 20 
S.D.L. REV. 598, 602-03 (1975). 
42 I d. at 602. 
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ulation by diminishing the oxygen supply and can turn a healthy lake 
into a putrid swamp.43 Motorboats are a primary cause of algae-
causing eutrophication because they kick up sediment from the lake 
floor. Motorboats also release significant amounts of exhaust and 
gasoline into the water,44 which may have a direct detrimental effect 
on the lake's condition. 45 
Lakeshore development can also exact a toll on wildlife in and 
around the lake. A great variety of waterfowl, aquatic mammals, 
and fish spend some part of their lives in the area closest to a lake's 
shoreline and are vulnerable to funnel development's particularly 
deleterious effects.46 For example, overuse of a lake generates sur-
face traffic in close proximity to the shoreline and affects loon nesting 
sites. 47 Furthermore, erosion and runoff caused by shoreline devel-
opment, as well as power boating, can destroy lakeshore vegetation. 
Such loss of vegetation disrupts wildlife, destroys shelter for ani-
mals, and decreases the lake's filtering capabilities. 48 
Development of lakeshore property thus affects seriously the 
health of the lake and the wildlife community it supports. This 
unhappy result spoils the lake for current lakeshore owners and the 
surrounding communities, and may make the lake unavailable for 
future generations to use and enjoy. Zoning and land use regulations 
can control development and prevent these damaging results. Zoning 
and land use laws, however, do not regulate lakeshore development 
effectively in all cases. While such regulations can restrain funnel 
development projects considerably, they are not always sufficient to 
protect the lake environment from degradation. 
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF ZONING AND LAND USE REGULATIONS 
State and local governments have long used zoning and land use 
laws as controls on land development. 49 These controls protect crit-
43 [d. 
44 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. 
45 [d. at 4. 
46 Teclaff & Teclaff, Saving the Land-Water Edge From Recreation, For Recreation, 14 
ARIZ. L. REV. 39 (1972). 
47 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 33. 
46 [d. at 28. Fertilizer can cause water quality and aesthetic problems by acting as a nutrient 
for algae and aquatic nuisance weeds. [d. at 20. Whether the source is cultivation of farmland, 
grooming of lawns and gardens, or urban-type runoff, introduction of chemicals not naturally 
found in a lake, or elevated levels of substances already there can lead to unhealthy infesta-
tions. [d. This deteriorates water quality and crowds out higher forms of aquatic life, including 
game fish. [d. at 29-30. 
49 See generally, R. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 1-14 (3d ed. 1982) 
(discussing historical development of land use controls). 
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ical environmental areas and ensure development suitable for par-
ticular types of land. 50 The 1926 Supreme Court decision in Euclid 
v. Amber established the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. 51 
The Court based its decision on the state's police power to protect 
the public's general welfare. 52 Euclid threw open the floodgates on 
land use controls, and today, these controls are the primary regu-
latory tools used by local governments to guide development within 
their jurisdictions. 53 All fifty states authorize these local regulations, 
and more than ten thousand local governments have adopted them. 54 
The form and substance of today's land use regulations have 
changed little since the 1920's and fall within typical patterns. 55 State 
legislatures enact enabling statutes that delegate the responsibility 
for land use planning to local government units. 56 These enabling 
statutes charge the local government unit with responsibility to 
create a comprehensive or master plan. 57 Without a comprehensive 
or master plan, no municipality may enact zoning ordinances. 58 In 
more recent years, state governments have repealed some of the 
enabling powers in order to exercise comprehensive planning them-
selves. 59 Accordingly, power to enact and enforce land use regula-
tions is vested currently in state and local governments. 60 
Often, however, state and local governments are unwilling to pro-
vide, or are incapable of providing, meaningful land use guidelines. 
This failure to provide such guidelines allows large-scale develop-
ment to proceed unchecked. 61 The state and local governments' in-
ability or unwillingness to restrict development stems from several 
factors. Economics plays a significant role in encouraging develop-
50 E.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 
A.2d 232 (1963); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
51 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
52 Id. at 390. The town of Euclid, Ohio, had adopted an ordinance dividing the municipality 
into districts and imposing land use classifications based on these subdivisions. Id. at 367. The 
Supreme Court reversed the district court, finding the ordinance a valid exercise of the state's 
police power. Id. at 397. 
53 LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE REFORM 19 (D. Listokin ed. 
1974). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 21. 
56 Local government units have no power to enact zoning ordinances in the absence of 
express enabling statutes granting the authority. R. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 657. 
57Id. at 662. 
58 I d. This requirement reflects the general theory that zoning is a tool to be used in 
achieving a comprehensive planning goal. Id. 
59 D. CALLIES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 901 (1986). 
60 See id. For a political and legal overview, see generally LAMB, LAND USE POLITICS AND 
LAW IN THE 1970s, at 5-12 (1975). 
61 Kusler, Carrying Controls, supra note 1, at 26. 
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ment of attractive but fragile shoreline areas. Municipal authorities 
are aware that development creates new sources of local revenue 
and employment. 62 Accordingly, municipalities often will not enact 
zoning laws that would obstruct lucrative shoreline development. 63 
Other problems exist when local governments are not organized 
sufficiently or in a position financially to undertake the regulatory 
process. Municipalities often have neither the money nor the exper-
tise required to conduct water and shoreland area studies and to 
devise effective plans. 64 For example, in southern Maine, where 
development pressure is partiCUlarly acute, local officials charged 
with making land use decisions are besieged by too many projects, 
and are armed with inadequate technical help and outdated or inef-
fective ordinances. 65 Local officials complain that, even if they were 
inclined to impose funnel development restrictions, they do not have 
the time or expertise to explore how to create and apply them. 66 
Similar pressures force regulators to approve major developments 
on a case-by-case basis and ignore the broader effect that haphazard 
development has on an area. 67 Local planning boards are so busy 
reacting to applications for new projects that they have no time for 
long range planning. 68 Furthermore, many towns that have compre-
hensive plans do not carry them out. Instead of incurring the trouble 
and expense of applying these plans, the towns ignore established 
goals of protecting resources or character. 69 
Some zoning problems are the result of confusion between state 
and local authority.70 In Maine, for example, the state determines 
minimum regulatory requirements, but looks to the local govern-
62Id. 
63Id. 
64 Id. Building Boom Overwhelms Controls on Development, Maine Sunday Telegram, 
August 24, 1986, at lA, col. 1 [hereinafter Building Boom]. 
65 Building Boom, supra note 64. 
66 Telephone interview with Peter Lowell, Director of the Lakes Environmental Association, 
Bridgton, Maine (September 22, 1986); Telephone interview with Lori Fisher, Lake Champlain 
Committee, Burlington, Vermont (September 23, 1986). 
67 MAINE STATE PLANNING OFFICE, DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHENING LAND USE 
MANAGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING IN MAINE 2 (November 20, 1986) [hereinafter DRAFT 
PROPOSAL]. 
68Id. 
69 I d. Size, however, is not necessarily a limiting factor in a small town's ability to enact 
effective zoning. For example, the town of Northfield, Maine (population 88) followed an 
eighteen month building moratorium with an ordinance that restricts shoreline development 
on Bog Lake considerably. Small Town, Big Ideas, Maine Times, July 31, 1987, at 9, col. 1. 
Town residents voted 36-6 to enact an ordinance that, among other things, limits building 
density around the lake to one unit per 15-20 acres, and extends watershed building controls 
to 750 feet from the water's edge. Id. 
70 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. 
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ments to enforce these requirements. 71 For reasons discussed above, 
local governments that are too small to create effective zoning have 
similar difficulties administering the state-designed regulations. 72 
Other problems arise if the local authority wishes to encourage 
development that state law is designed to restrict. Furthermore, 
even where both state and local officials agree that lakeshore devel-
opment needs regulation, each may point to the other as the true 
regulatory authority. 73 
Additional factors limit the effectiveness of zoning and land use 
restrictions. For example, sometimes towns themselves participate 
in the planning and execution of funnel development projects. This 
conflict of interest can compromise the town's role as regulator and 
enforcer of zoning ordinances. 74 Frequently, lakes and ponds cross 
the boundaries of several townships and municipalities, creating 
jurisdictional problems where there is little or no coordination among 
the towns on the same lake. 75 Even where all communities in a given 
lake region have adopted regulations to treat waterfront develop-
ment problems within their own jurisdictions, often there is no co-
ordinated, uniform approach toward relating regulations from one 
town to another. 76 
Furthermore, developers exploit loopholes in the law in order to 
avoid the cumbersome, time consuming project review process. 77 
For example, where zoning regulations restrict development within 
71 Title 38 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated requires each municipality to develop 
and enact zoning and subdivision control ordinances which meet minimum state-imposed 
standards. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 438 (1986). The Department of Environmental 
Protection and the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission impose zoning and land use 
ordinances on those municipalities that fail to adopt regulations which meet state standards. 
Id. § 442. 
72 Kusler, Carrying Controls, supra note 1, at 26. 
73 In New Hampshire, hearings concerning the development of Lake Winnipesaukee were 
held during the summer of 1984. LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 22. 
"A lot of finger pointing was directed at the state for not doing enough to enforce regulations 
already on the books or to help control development. At the same time, the state points out 
that these types of concerns should be addressed with a strong local input." Id. 
74 For example, in Burlington, Vermont, city officials participated in a controversial land 
swap arrangement with a developer who wished to develop a lakeshore parcel into a mixed 
residentiaVretail project. Some observers felt that the city's "neutral" role was compromised 
by its participation in the venture. Fisher interview, supra note 66. 
75 LAKES AND GREAT PONDS REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. 
76 For example, on Lake Winnipesaukee in New Hampshire, neither the town of Laconia 
nor the town of Gilford imposed any minimum shoreline frontage requirements on lakeshore 
parcel development, while six other towns had varying formulas for lakeshore lot frontage 
requirements. Id. 
77 Building Boom, supra note 64. 
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a given distance of the shoreline, funnel developers can build their 
units outside the restricted area, leaving the funnel to the lake 
unimproved. In this way, developers avoid the zoning restriction 
while still providing purchasers with lake access via the funnel. 78 
Where zoning fails to protect the interests of other riparian owners 
on a lake, these owners can raise the doctrines of private nuisance 
and reasonable use to counter funnel developments. These common 
law doctrines, however, present problems of their own that limit 
their effectiveness in dealing with overdevelopment of lakes and 
ponds. 
IV. NUISANCE AND REASONABLE USE DOCTRINES AS REMEDIES 
FOR OVERDEVELOPMENT OF WATERFRONT PROPERTY 
The common law continues to play an important role in achieving 
and maintaining clean water environments in the United States. 79 
In addition to zoning and land use regulatory requirements, lake-
shore funnel development is subject to common law limitations. Law-
suits based on legal theories such as nuisance, trespass, negligence, 
abnormally dangerous activities, and interference with riparian 
rights have "filled the gaps" left by water control statutes and reg-
ulations. 80 Some riparian property owners who oppose funnel devel-
opment projects on their lakes have turned to the common law 
theories of nuisance law and reasonable use of riparian rights for a 
remedy. 
A. Reasonable Use of Riparian Rights 
Generally, riparian rights stem from ownership of land abutting a 
waterway.81 As fee simple owners of waterfront property, funnel 
developers have the same riparian rights other riparian owners en-
joy. Riparian ownership carries rights and privileges in the abutting 
waterway, as well as limitations and obligations that limit riparian 
use. 82 Riparian common law doctrine restricts water use to the own-
78 See id. 
79 See W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 217-19 (1984). 
80 See id. 
8! Strictly speaking, rights stemming from ownership of land abutting a lake or pond carries 
littoral rights, while riparian rights stem from ownership of land abutting a stream or river. 
However, most courts and observers have merged the two terms in discussing waterfront 
development. Accordingly, this Comment uses the term riparian to mean ownership of land 
abutting lakes and ponds as well as rivers and streams. 
82 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
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ers of the land abutting the watercourse.83 Riparian rights are not 
common to citizens at large, but exist only as a right that flows from 
ownership of shoreline land. 84 
Riparian uses are divided generally into two classes; natural and 
artificial uses. 85 Natural uses are those that are absolutely necessary, 
such as quenching thirst and maintaining a household. 86 Artificial 
uses, such as use for commercial profit and recreation, merely in-
crease comfort and prosperity but are not essential. 87 Common ar-
tificial uses include skating, fishing, swimming, and boating, in ad-
dition to development for commercial purposes. 88 Riparian owners 
may use as much water as they need for natural purposes, regardless 
of how this use affects other riparian owners on the same body of 
water.89 An owner exercising riparian rights for recreation or com-
mercial venture, however, cannot interfere with the rights of other 
riparians to the same body of water. 90 
Because commercial development constitutes an artificial use of 
riparian land, a project cannot interfere with other riparian owner's 
rights. 91 The reasonable use doctrine has emerged as the standard 
for determining the level of tolerable interference with the riparian 
owner's rights. 92 Under the reasonable use doctrine, all riparian 
owners have rights to use the surface area of the lake, as long as 
their use does not burden another riparian owner's use unreasona-
bly.93 
83 Note, Riparian Water Law-Lakeshore Developments, 1966 WIse. L. REV. 172, 173. 
84 Id. 
85 Thompson, 379 Mich. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 483-84. 
86 Id. "Without these uses both man and beast would perish." Id. 
87Id. 
88 See Kusler, Carrying Controls, supra note 1, at 20. 
89 Thompson, 379 Mich. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 483. 
90 Id. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 484. 
91Id. 
92 Recent Cases, Surface Water Disputes in Ohio Will be Governed by the Reasonable-Use 
Rule Whereby a Landowner is Liable to Another Landowner Only When the Former's Harm-
ful Interference with the Flow of Surface Water is Unreasonable-McGlashan v. Spade Rock-
ledge Terrace Condo Development Corp., 49 CINN. L. REV. 914, 915 (1980). The courts in this 
country have used three rules to adjudicate surface water disputes: the civil law rule, the 
common enemy rule, and the reasonable use rule. Id. According to the civil law rule, in its 
purest form, a riparian owner cannot interfere with another riparian owner's rights to the 
surface water without incurring liability for resulting damage. Id. The antithesis of the civil 
law rule is the common enemy rule, that allows a riparian owner to use his land and dispose 
of surface water without regard to the resulting effect on other riparian owners. Id. The 
reasonable use rule allows a riparian owner to make reasonable use of the surface water, even 
if such use interferes with the flow of surface water in a manner harmful to other landowners. 
Id. The reasonable use rule is most prevalent today, wherein a landowner incurs liability only 
when unreasonably causing harmful interference. See id. 
93 For a discussion of the various ways states have attributed surface water rights to 
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The Michigan case of Thompson v. Enz sets forth general stan-
dards for examining funnel developments. 94 In Thompson, the de-
velopers were owners of approximately 1,415 feet of frontage on a 
lake. The funnel development plan called for creation of 144 to 156 
lots, only 16 of which would directly border the lake. The balance of 
the lots would have lake access by means of proposed canals that 
the developer would construct. 95 The Michigan Supreme Court held 
that a funnel development project constitutes an artificial use that 
requires application of the reasonable use standard. 96 
In holding that the funnel development plan constituted an unrea-
sonable use, the Thompson court set out a number of factors to 
consider in applying the reasonable use standard. 97 The trial court 
should examine the watercourse and its attributes, including its size, 
character, and natural state. The trial court should also examine the 
proposed use itself to determine its type, extent, necessity, effect 
on the quantity, quality, and level of the water, and the purposes of 
the users.98 Finally, the court must examine the proposed artificial 
use in relation to the beneficial and detrimental effects on the rights 
and interests of other riparian proprietors as well as those of the 
state. 99 
Commercial profit is another factor courts may consider in evalu-
ating funnel development cases. 100 A funnel developer maximizes 
profits by giving all purchasers access to the water.101 Accordingly, 
commercial profit is the reason a funnel developer increases use of 
riparian owners, see Annotation, Allocation of Water Space Among Lakefront Owners, In 
Absence of Agreement or Specification, 14 A.L.R. 4th 1028 (1982). 
94 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473. Another leading case is Florio v. State, in which riparian 
lake owners were required to scale back the operation of a water skiing school on a lake. 119 
So.2d 305, 310 (Fla. 1960). The Florida court held that "the use of lands which border on 
waters of a nonriparian lake for purposes of pleasure, recreation, and health is a use which 
requires a remedy on behalf of a riparian owner where there is unreasonable interference ... 
one riparian owner is not entitled to use the lake to the exclusion of other riparian owners." 
I d. Thompson is considered the leading case where this reasonable exercise of riparian rights 
doctrine is applied to lakeshore development projects. E.g., Kusler, Carrying Capacity, supra 
note 1, at 20. 
95 Thompson, 379 Mich. at 668, 154 N.W.2d at 474. 
96 Id. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 484. "Use for an artificial purpose must be (a) only for the 
benefit of the riparian land and (b) reasonable in light of the correlative rights of the other 
proprietors. It is clear in the case before us that the use made of the property by the defendants 
is for a strictly artificial purpose and must meet the test of reasonableness." I d. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. Commercial development is an artificial purpose that must therefore meet the reason-
ableness criteria. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
99 Thompson, 367 Mich. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 485. The public's rights in inland lakes and 
streams within the state is discussed infra at notes 133-62 and accompanying text. 
100 See Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122, 128, 192 N.W.2d 366,369 (1971). 
101 See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. 
118 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:105 
his riparian parcel. In applying the reasonable use analysis, one court 
emphasized that it will not tolerate lightly one riparian's commercial 
profit at the expense of another's enjoyment of riparian rights. 102 
The criteria set forth in Thompson can thus be summarized as 
follows: courts should first give attention to the size, character, and 
natural state of the water course. Then, courts should consider the 
type and purpose of the proposed uses and their effect on the water 
course. Finally, courts should balance the benefit that would inure 
to the proposed user against the injury to the other riparian own-
ers. 103 While the specific issue of funnel development has not reached 
the appellate court level in states other than Michigan, courts in 
other states would probably apply a similar analysis that recognizes 
a reasonableness standard for use of riparian rights. 104 
The reasonableness doctrine thus balances the parties' interests 
to determine whether a proposed use is reasonable. Lakeshore own-
ers can use this doctrine to protect their individual riparian rights. 
Similarly, riparian owners may challenge a proposed development of 
riparian land based on the nuisance doctrine. 105 
B. Nuisance Theory and Riparian Rights 
Nuisance theory requires courts to explore whether a funnel de-
velopment proposal is reasonable in much the same manner as if the 
challenge were based on unreasonable interference with riparian 
rights. 106 Private nuisances, like the usurpation of relative riparian 
rights, are unreasonable interferences with the enjoyment of rights 
102 See Pierce, 35 Mich. App. at 128, 192 N.W. 2d at 369. Pierce involved an action to enjoin 
a riparian owner with 373 feet of frontage on a small lake from digging a canal through their 
one riparian parcel to provide lake access to 90 lots immediately behind the lakeshore parcel. 
[d. In determining that this use was unreasonable, the court noted that 
[d. 
the proposed real estate development would overcrowd the lake for what appears to 
be a commercial exploitation only. We see no reason to deprive the present riparian 
owners of the enjoyment of the lake when the only reason for increasing the burden 
on the lake is merely the commercial profit of the owner of one riparian lot. 
103 Three Lakes Ass'n v. Kessler, 91 Mich. App. 371, 377, 285 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1979). 
104 For a discussion of riparian land use, see Note, Riparian Water Law-Lakeshore Devel-
opments, supra note 83; Comment, Public Recreation on Non-navigable Lakes and the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Use, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1064 (1970); Teclaff & Teclaff, supra note 46; 
Recent Cases, supra note 92, at 914; Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water Dist. v. 
Maine Turnpike Auth., 71 A.2d 520 (Me. 1950); Florio, 119 So. 2d at 310; Donaghey v. Croteau, 
401 A.2d 1081 (N.H. 1979). 
106 Any distinction between violation of relative riparian rights and nuisance as creating 
separate tests of reasonableness is tentative. Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1033. 
106 See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text. 
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in real property. 107 The common law approach to nuisance resembles 
the reasonableness determination, that is, balancing the utility of 
the proposed use against the potential of harm to others. 108 In eval-
uating whether a particular use is burdensome to a neighbor's rights, 
some courts adopt nuisance theory terminology while others prefer 
to apply the reasonable use doctrine. 109 
Courts may consider a variety of factors in determining whether 
an activity constitutes a nuisance, including: the challenged activity 
is not customary or suited to the area; the activity causes observable 
effects that most of us would find disagreeable, independent of 
whether such effects in fact harm the plaintiff; plaintiff's method of 
implementing the activity produces more disturbance than other 
available methods; or defendant began his activity after the plaintiff 
began the present use of his land. l1° This private nuisance analysis 
employs factors that are similar to those set out in Thompson v. 
Enz111 to evaluate development under the reasonable use doctrine. 112 
Accordingly, the two doctrines afford similar results. 113 
As in riparian rights cases, nuisance actions are not confined to a 
single type of activity that overloads the water surface. Large num-
bers of people using a lake for general recreational purposes can 
constitute a nuisance. 114 Riparian owners may use the lake personally 
or open up the entire surface of the lake to the public through their 
own private rights. Courts may, however, enjoin individual riparian 
owners' lake use as either unreasonable or as a nuisance to the extent 
that the use unreasonably impinges on the correlative rights of other 
riparian owners. 115 
107 "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard." Euclid, 272 U. S. at 388. 
lOB Courts apply this balancing determination on a case by case basis. For example, in 
Florio, the court noted that "water skiing is not a nuisance per se. Normally it is a legitimate 
and wholesome pursuit. The chancellor found it to be a nuisance here because of the extent 
to which it was pursued under the circumstances delineated and determined." 119 So.2d at 
310. 
109 Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1033. 
llO R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.2, at 415 (1984). 
III 379 Mich. at 686, 154 N.W.2d at 484. 
ll2 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
ll3 Private nuisance is defined as that which "by its continuous use or existence works 
annoyance, harm, inconvenience or damage to another landowner in the enjoyment of his 
property ... [it is alctivity which results in an unreasonable interference with the use and 
enjoyment of another's property .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979). The 
definition of reasonable use theory states that "a riparian owner may make reasonable use of 
his water for either natural or artificial wants. However, he may not so use his rights so as 
to affect the quantity or quality of water available to a lower riparian owner." ld. at 1139. 
ll4 Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1036. 
ll5ld. 
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C. Shortcomings of the Reasonable Use and Nuisance Doctrines 
as Remedies for Overdevelopment 
Nuisance and reasonable use law are effective causes 0f action 
under which a riparian owner may bring suit to stop a funnel devel-
opment. This Comment suggests, however, that in stressing the 
injury to the individual riparian owner's interests, the fundamental 
bases of these doctrines fail to address adequately a larger picture 
that includes the public interest. 116 This failure raises legal and prac-
tical considerations that limit the effectiveness of these doctrines. 
For example, individual riparian owners will likely have economic 
difficulty standing alone in a suit against a developer. Any challenge 
to a funnel development in court is certain to incur prohibitively 
high expenses.117 The costs of conducting lake quality and carrying 
capacity studies alone are enormous, and an insufficient economic 
war chest could prove fatal to a riparian owner's quest for a judicial 
remedy.1I8 Even where the riparian owners form a private lake 
association to bring suit, litigation expenses mount quickly and may 
bankrupt the association's resources.1I9 The uncertainty of nuisance 
and reasonable use litigation120 exacerbates the need for adequate 
funding. The factors set forth in Thompson v. Enz indicate that a 
court must weigh a number of subjective factors in reaching its 
decision. 121 Determining reasonableness in common law involves a 
complex balancing of numerous facts and factors, many of which are 
dependent on intangible criteria. 122 The results are therefore unpre-
116 The public has rights in many inland waterways held in trust by the state that may be 
violated by inappropriate funnel development. See infra notes 133-159 and accompanying 
text. 
117 See Comment, Who Pays for Litigation: Recent Developments in Attorneys Fees Law, 
15 Envtl. L. Rep. 10348 (Envtl. L. lnst. 1985) (urging courts to award attorney's fees in 
environmental litigation). 
118 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
119 Lake associations have standing to bring such suits. See, e.g., Three Lakes Ass'n, 91 
Mich. App. at 371,285 N.W.2d at 300. 
120 See infra notes 122--24 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
122 As one court put it, 
not every intentional and substantial invasion of a person's interest in the use and 
enjoyment of land is actionable ... life in organized society ... involves an unavoid-
able clash of individual interests. Practically all human activities ... interfere to 
some extent with others or involve some risk of interference .... [E]ach individual 
in a community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and 
interference, and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on 
together .... Liability is imposed only in those cases where the harm or risk to one 
is greater than he ought to be required to bear under the circumstances. 
Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158--59 (N.H. 1972). 
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dictable. 123 This uncertainty reduces the chances for settlement, an 
option that could save both sides considerable litigation expenses. 124 
Proponents of environmental causes often enjoy monetary and 
manpower support from various national and local organizations, 
such as the Conservation Law Foundation, that are dedicated to 
preserving common resources. 125 However, a funnel development 
suit based on nuisance or unreasonable use focuses necessarily on 
preserving the lake for the use and enjoyment of the privileged few 
who are fortunate enough to own lakeside property. This focus on 
private rights rather than resources common to the public may 
dampen enthusiasm and inhibit valuable economic support from oth-
erwise sympathetic environmental groups. Such organizations that 
have the resources to provide both financial and technical assistance 
are not likely to join a fight to preserve an exclusive recreational 
water playground. 
Similarly, courts may be reluctant to find for riparian owners who 
want to prevent more people from enjoying the benefits of lakeshore 
access. Instead, courts may favor a development that provides mul-
tiple owners with water access to an otherwise inaccessible lake. In 
123 "Judicial decisions often conflict. Failure of state courts to make definitive settlements 
regarding reasonableness at the appellate level adds to the time and expense of litigation and 
prolongs the uncertainty that decisive judicial action would remedy." Bartke & Patton, supra 
note 4, at 1062. 
124 Developers and riparian owners involved in a nuisance or reasonable use action each 
incur large legal expenses. Developers are, however, often in a financial position superior to 
opposing riparian owners and would be more likely to survive a war of attrition. On the other 
hand, the threat of prolonged litigation could force developers to settle because of financing 
commitments that frequently are tied to a timetable. Prolonged litigation would likely disturb 
such a timetable and accordingly could upset financial backing for a development project. 
Bartke & Patton, supra note 4, at 1021-23. 
[d. 
An important constraint in any real estate project is financing. The nature, availability 
and terms of financing determine the economic feasibility and profitability of any 
project . . . . Since prolonged litigation to determine the rights of the parties may 
mean disaster for the project, it would behoove those who want to develop and 
market recreational land to understand legislative restrictions and other correlative 
rights of riparian owners. 
125 The Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. ("CLF") is a public interest, 
environmental law organization dedicated to the conservation and preservation of New Eng-
land's natural resources. CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC., AN-
NUAL REPORT 1985-1986, at 2. CLF assists individual citizens, professionals, private orga-
nizations, and governmental agencies in matters of environmental law. [d. Other 
environmental groups such as the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club actively 
represent environmental conservation interests in land use disputes nationally. See, e.g., Nat'l 
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 
1975). 
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essence, the riparian owners may appear to be maintaining an elitist 
retreat that excludes others from sharing their lake. A court, weigh-
ing the riparian owner's elitist interests against the interests of those 
who wish to increase lake access, may be inclined to favor the latter. 
The reasonable use and nuisance doctrines' focus on the injury to 
the individual riparian owner rather than the damage to a public 
resource underscores this elitist perception. 126 
Accordingly, the doctrines of nuisance and reasonable use fail to 
take into account the public's interest in preserving lakes as valuable 
public resources. This failure limits these doctrine's effectiveness by 
focusing on the harm to individual owners, and thus alienating im-
portant potential sources of support within the community. The 
public trust doctrine represents a viable alternative common law 
argument that avoids these pitfalls, properly considering the public's 
interest in enjoining improper funnel development on public trust 
lakes. Under the public trust doctrine, the public's interest in pre-
serving public trust lands is the courts' primary concern. 
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST ALTERNATIVE 
The modern public trust doctrine currently is in a state of expan-
sion. Since 1970, when Professor Joseph Sax published his seminal 
article on the subject,127 courts have developed a substantial body of 
case law that applies the public trust doctrine to land use manage-
ment issues. 128 A significant body of legal commentary on the subject 
has also emerged. 129 Recent judicial expansion of the public trust 
126 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
127 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
128 E.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 419, 658 P.2d at 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 346; 
State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 865 (1981); State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240,625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. 
Rptr. 713, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) 
(later codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 559 (1981); James v. Inhabitants of West Bath, 
437 A.2d 863 (Me. 1981); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 
(1979). This list is intended to be representative only and is not an exhaustive compilation of 
cases addressing the public trust doctrine. 
129 E.g., Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future 
Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1980); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public 
Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980); Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream 
Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980); Stevens, The Public Trust: A 
Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 195 (1980); Comment, Protecting National Parks from Developments Beyond Their 
Borders, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1189 (1984); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massa-
chusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839 (1984) [hereinafter Massachusetts 
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doctrine has not gone uncriticized. 130 Nonetheless, courts generally 
have been receptive to the public trust doctrine's application in an 
increasing range of land use cases. 131 
Public trust commentators have documented thoroughly the his-
torical development of the public trust doctrine from ancient Roman 
law, through English common law, to its modern applications. 132 This 
Comment therefore does not attempt to restate this history. Nor 
does this Comment join the debate over the benefits and disadvan-
tages of an expanded public trust doctrine. Rather, this Comment 
discusses how the public trust doctrine is a viable way for riparian 
owners to prevent developers from creating funnel development 
projects on lakes that are vulnerable to damage from excessive 
development. 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
It is a basic proposition, well settled by usage, statute, and judicial 
decision, that navigable waters133 belong to the public and are held 
in trust by the state for the public. 134 This proposition first mani-
fested itself in this country in the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance 
of 1641-47, which declared that bodies of water in excess of ten acres 
were the property of the public at large for fishing or fowling. 135 The 
Public Trust]. This list is intended to be representative only and is not an exhaustive com-
pilation of public trust doctrine discussion. 
130 "The difficult problems that beset the development and implementation of modern envi-
ronmental and natural resources law are no longer aided by resort to a legal doctrine, such 
as the public trust." Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 702 (1986); see 
Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings 
of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DEN. U. L. REV. 565 (1986). 
131 Approximately one hundred cases involving the public trust doctrine were reported 
between 1970 and 1986. Lazarus, supra note 130, at 644. 
132 For a thorough historical documentation of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, supra note 
127, at 472-91. 
133 Courts have broadened considerably the definition of "navigability" in its application to 
the public trust doctrine. Under that doctrine, "navigability" means any body of water of 
sufficient size to sustain transport of very small watercraft, even pleasure boating. For a 
discussion of navigability and the public trust doctrine, see Stevens, supra note 129, at 201-
10. 
134 E.g., State v. George C. Stafford & Sons, 105 A.2d 569 (N.H. 1954); State v. Deetz, 224 
N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974); Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 
23 (1960). For further discussion, see Leighty, Public Rights in Navigable State Waters-
Some Statutory Approaches, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 459 (1971). 
135 Ancient Charters and Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts (1814), quoted 
in J. WHITTLESEY, LAW OF THE SEASHORE, TIDEWATERS AND GREAT PONDS IN MASSACHU-
SETTS AND MAINE XXV (1932). 
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Ordinance also granted free access across private property to exer-
cise these public rights.136 Similar ordinances protected freshwater 
lakes in other parts of New England. 137 
As other states entered the Union, they too became entitled to 
the land under their navigable waters, subject to the public trust. 138 
Most states continue to hold their inland lakes in trust for the pub-
lic. 139 In at least one such public trust state, however, a court has 
allowed the transfer of a public trust lake to private ownership. 140 
Accordingly, riparian owners raising the public trust doctrine must 
first establish whether the state or a private party holds the title to 
the submerged lands, and whether the owner holds the land subject 
to the .public trust. 141 
In its earliest and purest application, the public trust doctrine 
prevented a state from granting title to publicly held lands to private 
parties and thus divesting the public of common rights.142 In 1892, 
the United States Supreme Court created the framework upon which 
the modern public trust doctrine is based. 143 In Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois, the Court determined that a state cannot grant 
lands to private citizens that it holds in trust for the public, nor can 
the state divest itself of its fiduciary responsibility for that land. 144 
Illinois Central has endured as the seminal case that establishes the 
foundation of the modern public trust doctrine. 145 Relying upon Il-
linois Central, courts from Massachusetts to California have justified 
an assortment of decisions that have protected natural resources 
from degradation or destruction under the public trust doctrine. 146 
136Id. 
137 Stevens, supra note 129, at 199. 
138 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57--58 (1894). 
139 See Lazarus, supra note 130, at 647-48. 
140 See Lynnfield v. Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 106 N.E. 977 (1914). In Lynnfield, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged the colonial General Court's grant of a 500 
acre pond to private hands in 1635. Id. Because the private party received the grant prior to 
enactment of the Colonial Ordinances of 1641-1647, the Lynnfield court acknowledged the 
grant as valid. Id. at 325, 106 N.E. at 980. "And the weight of the authority is that under 
the original rule of the common law, and before the common law of Massachusetts was declared 
by the colonial ordinance to be otherwise for the future, ponds like this might by a proper 
grant be made the subject of private property." Id. 
141 Courts generally are reluctant to impose a fiduciary duty where lands are held in a less 
proprietary fashion. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 
1974) (addressing the federal government's fiduciary obligation to manage federal lands). 
142 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
143 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
144 Id. 
145 Professor Sax declared Illinois Central to be the "lodestar" of the modern public trust 
doctrine. Sax, supra note 127, at 489. 
146 Huffman, supra note 130, at 565. 
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The public trust doctrine's central premise is that fiduciary duties 
limit how a state may dispose of and manage public trust resources. 
The state holds those resources in trust for the public and must 
dispose of or manage those resources in a manner consistent with 
that trust. 147 "The public trust .. .is an affirmation of the duty of the 
state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, 
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only 
in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with 
the purposes of the trust. "148 The state thus must act as public 
trustee of these resources, and citizens may sue to force the state 
to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities. 149 
Submerged lands were the subject of the original public trust 
primarily because fishing and navigation were vital to the commerce 
of an emerging nation. 150 Private parties that held submerged lands 
could not use the lands in a way that would impede these critical 
commercial activities. 151 Navigation and fishing for commerce thus 
were the two principal bases for using the public trust doctrine to 
protect inland waterways in the 18th and 19th centuries. 152 
Modern courts, however, have extended the public trust doctrine's 
reach beyond its original narrow goal of protecting commerce. 153 
Today, a primary application of the public trust doctrine is to protect 
inland waterways from environmental degradation. l54 States have a 
fiduciary duty to preserve public trust lands in their natural state 
for use by the public. 155 Any use that will alter the land from its 
147Id. at 567. 
148 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (Mono 
Lake, California, is part of the public trust, and therefore the state cannot allow injurious 
diversion of the tributaries that replenish the lake's water supply). 
149 Comment, The Public Trust After Lyon and Fogerty: Private Interests and Public 
Expectations-A New Balance, 16 D.C. DAVIS L. REV. 631, 632 (1983). 
150 Illinois Central, 146 D.S. at 452. 
151Id. 
152 Stevens, supra note 129, at 201-02. 
153 "Illinois Central emphasized the flexibility with which the public trust doctrine should 
be interpreted, and thus set the tone for its further development by the individual states." 
Massachusetts Public Trust, supra note 129, at 848. See also Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 
3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (the trust purpose had changed along with 
public needs and values). 
154 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (ecological 
preservation protected by the public trust doctrine); see also Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-
Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) (recreational uses of swimming and bathing protected by 
the public trust doctrine). 
155 Professor Sax outlines three types of restrictions imposed upon the states as trustees of 
public lands. Sax, supra note 127, at 477. The trust property must be used for a common 
purpose and available for use by the general public. Id. The property may not be sold. Finally, 
the land must be maintained for particular types of uses. Id. A breach of these restrictions 
constitutes an impairment of the public trust which is actionable against the state. See id. 
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natural state is subject to challenge based on the public trust doc-
trine. 156 In the earliest application of the doctrine, the use had to 
completely change the public trust land from its natural state to 
another state that completely frustrated its traditional use. 157 Sub-
sequent court decisions, however, have relaxed this complete frus-
tration requirement. l58 This judicial relaxation of the complete frus-
tration requirement is consistent with the flexibility indicated in the 
dicta of the Illinois Central opinion. 159 
Accordingly, a use need not change completely the nature of the 
public trust land. In striking down a planned ski development in 
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court emphasized in its analysis a number of factors 
that indicated incompatibility of the use with its trust purpose, 
including the development's interference with the area's ecology, the 
degree to which private developers would profit financially from the 
development, and the limitation of the development's use to skiers. 160 
The Greylock Reservation court struck down the development as an 
intrusion upon the public trust land's present use, without requiring 
a showing that the development would frustrate existing uses com-
pletely.161 According to this analysis, a development can violate the 
public trust merely if the development is incompatible with the 
principles established by the public trust doctrine. 162 
156 "It is thought to be incumbent upon the government to regulate water uses for the 
general benefit of the community and to take account thereby of the public nature and the 
interdependency which the physical quality of the resource implies." [d. at 485. 
157 In this antiquated view of the public trust doctrine, a proposed use violated the public 
trust only if the trust land's traditional use was no longer possible. Sax, supra note 127, at 
477. Professor Sax's classic example of this is a comparison between building a marina or a 
land fill project on San Francisco Bay. [d. The marina would still allow the Bay its traditional 
maritime use, while a trash land fill would prevent this traditional use in the filled area. [d. 
Thus the land fill would violate the public trust while the marina would not. [d. 
158 See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 419,658 P.2d at 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 346 
(diversion of water flowing to public trust lake affects the public trust, despite the use of the 
diverted water for traditional uses of irrigation, industry, and personal consumption); Gould 
v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (creating a ski area 
on public trust lands affects the public trust, despite that the intended use of the lands 
included public recreational use and access). 
159 "The bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people of the State in their character 
as sovereign in trust for public uses for which they are adapted." Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 
at 457-58 (dicta). This language is thought to emphasize the flexibility of the public trust 
doctrine. Massachusetts Public Trust, supra note 129, at 848. 
160 Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. at 423-28, 215 N.E.2d at 122-26. 
161 [d. at 410, 215 N.E.2d at 114. 
162 See id.; see also Massachusetts Public Trust, supra note 129, at 875. 
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B. Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to Funnel Development 
A court evaluating a funnel development project under the public 
trust doctrine may apply an analysis similar to the analysis applied 
in Greylock Reservation Commission. l63 Funnel development proj-
ects can interfere with the lake's ecology through overintensive 
recreational use of the lake, as well as through pollution common to 
lakeside residential developments. 164 The funnel developer stands to 
benefit financially from the increased profits that accompany the sale 
of water access with each dwelling unit. 165 Finally, this form of 
development typically does not increase general public access to the 
lake, and therefore would result in private gain at public expense. 166 
A funnel development that will lead in time to deterioration and 
destruction of the lake is thus incompatible with the principles es-
tablished by the public trust doctrine. 167 
The state has a fiduciary obligation to maintain the trust lands for 
the public. l68 The public trust doctrine represents a judicial effort to 
remedy a perceived failure of modern legislative action to protect 
needs other than those expressed by private parties with immediate, 
specific interests in developing the land. 169 If the state allows dete-
rioration of the lake by permitting overuse and overdevelopment, 
then the state is creating an actionable breach of the public trust. 
Therefore, a riparian owner opposed to a funnel development may 
name the state as a defendant in litigation based on the public trust 
doctrine. 170 
163 350 Mass. at 410, 215 N.E.2d at 114; see supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. 
1661d. 
167 For example, scenic views, clean air, and use of a lake by birds for nesting and feeding 
are all values protected by the public trust doctrine. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 
658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356. 
168 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
169 Professor Sax recognized that the public trust doctrine provides a justifiable means for 
the courts to redress shortcomings in the legislative approach to public trust lands. Sax, supra 
note 127, at 521. "The 'public trust' has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no 
more-and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the 
democratic process." I d. 
170 Standing to sue the state for violations of the public trust has not been a problem. 
Lazarus, supra note 130, at 659. Recent cases reflect a liberalization in American courts of 
the requirements for achieving standing in environmental cases. ld. 
Riparian owners can also name private developers in public trust litigation. However, the 
developer's use of the riparian land is limited by the reasonable use doctrine, and action 
against the developer would proceed more properly on that basis. For a discussion of the 
reasonable use doctrine, see supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text. 
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Historically, the public trust doctrine prevented a state from re-
leasing the public trust lands into private hands.171 The rationale for 
this restriction was that in private hands, the public trust lands 
could be converted to uses that exclude the uses the public currently 
enjoys.172 In contrast, the state does not convey lakes directly to 
funnel developers. The title to the submerged lands remains with 
the public as part of the public trust, and the developer uses the 
submerged lands for its private purposes. However, the effect of a 
state allowing a funnel development project is similar to an actual 
conveyance of title to private hands. An adverse environmental 
impact can occur, despite the fact that the developers do not obtain 
a fee simple interest in the submerged lands. Furthermore, the 
public, due to diminished lake access and enjoyment, suffers equally 
whether the cause is a permitted funnel development project or a 
grant in fee simple. Where the public trust is endangered, the fact 
that no conveyance to private hands actually took place should have 
no bearing on the applicability of the public trust doctrine. In either 
case, the state has damaged the public trust corpus and thus 
breached its fiduciary duty to preserve public trust lands for the 
public. Accordingly, under this analysis, the state should be liable 
to the public as beneficiaries of the public trust under the public 
trust doctrine, even where it did not actually convey the property 
to private hands. 
Some observers have noted that the expanding public trust doc-
trine presents a threat to riparian owners.173 Where states have 
asserted the public trust to gain water access easements for the 
public over private land, this is an accurate observation. Waterfront 
riparian owners would lose their exclusive rights to enjoy the water-
front ownership benefits if the state imposed public access easements 
to the water over privately held property. Protecting "environmental 
values by means of the public trust can be achieved in some cases 
171 Courts are most likely to consider legislative action to be for a private purpose, and thus 
impermissible, when the state places submerged lands into private hands and the future use 
will exclude the public. Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: 
Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105, 143 (1985). 
172 One application of the public trust doctrine employed in Massachusetts incorporates the 
common law concept of prior public use. Massachusetts Public Trust, supra note 129, at 884-
85. Prior public use is a principle of eminent domain that says that legislative action is required 
to change the public use of public lands to another, inconsistent, use. [d. "The implementation 
of public trust concepts through the prior public use doctrine ... is a ... well-established 
doctrine which, like the public trust doctrine itself, focuses on the uses of land and acts 
defensively to protect existing uses .... " [d. at 884. 
173 See generally, Comment, supra note 149, at 658. 
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only at the expense of a waterfront landowner's development pre-
rogatives."174 The public trust doctrine can prevent states from al-
lowing developers to commercially develop riparian property and 
overextend lake use. For riparian owners who oppose a funnel de-
velopment, the public trust doctrine provides a legal basis to stop 
this threat to the lake's environmental balance. The public trust 
doctrine is thus an asset to the riparian owner who wishes to main-
tain the status quo, and a threat to riparian owners with commercial 
development plans for their riparian property. 
Private owners who oppose funnel developments should emphasize 
the harm to the public's interests rather than the harm the riparian 
owners will suffer personally because of the funnel development. 
The public trust argument shifts the focus of litigation from a com-
parison of private interest harms to a focus on the harm to the 
public's interests in the public trust lands. 175 Traditionally, private 
landowners' tangible expectations have enjoyed recognition greater 
than legitimate public expectations. The greater recognition exists 
because individual landowners have asserted their rights expressly 
in the legal process. 176 A riparian owner raising the public trust 
doctrine, however, shifts the court's focus from competing private 
interests to the public's expectation of ecosystem stability and pro-
tection in public trust lands. 177 
The public trust doctrine meets its strongest opposition where the 
state attempts to acquire rights in privately held land and rededicate 
it to public use. 178 Under this application of the public trust doctrine, 
the state asserts that it never had a right to convey public trust land 
174 I d. at 634. 
175 In State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), the court avoided any discussion of private burdens. 
29 Cal. 3d at 240, 625 P.2d at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The majority's opinion focused on 
the potential harm from shorezone degradation. Id. at 244-47, 625 P.2d at 259-60; see Com-
ment, supra note 149, at 649. 
176 Comment, supra note 149, at 658. 
177 See id. 
178 In NoHan v. California Coastal Commission, the California Coastal Commission had 
granted owners of a seaside bungalow the right to demolish and replace the structure on the 
condition that the owners grant the public an easement over the property to an adjacent 
public beach. 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (U.S. June 26, 1987) (86-133). The United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged that states have the power to condition land use permits upon a concession 
of property rights by the owner in order to further a legitimate state interest. Id. at 5147. 
The Court also acknowledged that the Commission's goal of creating a continuous strip of 
publicly accessible beach along the coast may be a good idea. Id. at 5149. The Court held, 
however, that the condition violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, noting that 
"[ w lhatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state interests' in the takings and land use 
contexts, this is not one of them" and referring to the plan as "an out-and-out plan of extortion." 
Id. at 5148. 
130 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:105 
into private use. 179 Any private holder of public trust land thus holds 
the land subject to the state's fiduciary interest, and the state is 
justified in claiming easements over the privately held land. 180 These 
public trust claims by the state raise constitutional questions con-
cerning public taking of private lands without compensation. 181 
Riparian owners opposed to funnel development, however, need 
not address the taking issue at all. Instead, the riparian owner's 
public trust argument should be that the state fails to fulfill its 
fiduciary duties when it allows environmentally threatening funnel 
development projects to proceed. 182 The public trust doctrine as 
applied to funnel development would not demand the return to public 
owner.flhip of any portion of the developer's private riparian rights. 
There would be no constitutional issue of taking because developers 
hold the riparian rights subject to the public trust as well as the 
government's fiduciary duty to protect the lake. While the public 
trust doctrine prevents states from permitting developers to damage 
the trust through overintensive use, nothing in the doctrine pre-
cludes developers from using public lakes at a historically noncon-
sumptive level. Because developers do not lose any rights that own-
ers of the particular riparian parcel enjoyed historically, no taking 
which requires compensation occurs.l83 Developers may continue to 
use their rights of riparian ownership at a stable, existing level of 
intensity, and there will be no taking. 
There is, however, one significant obstacle that may prevent a 
riparian owner from raising the public trust doctrine successfully in 
opposition to funnel development. One of the criteria for the public 
trust doctrine is that the land must be available for use by the 
179 Just Whose Land Is It-Anyway?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 3. 
18°Id. 
181 See generally Nollan, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145. A major factor promoting the use of the public 
trust doctrine as a means to achieve natural resource goals has been the argument that the 
doctrine creates no takings problems. Lazarus, supra note 130, at 648. The public trust 
doctrine reflects the assertion of public rights that preexist any private property rights in the 
affected resource. Id. Its application, therefore, cannot be deemed a taking of private property. 
Id. 
182 As Professor Sax notes, 
when a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, 
a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which 
is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject 
public uses to the self-interest of private parties. 
Sax, supra note 127, at 490. 
183 For a discussion of compensation issues on public property, see Corker, Thou Shalt Not 
Fill Public Waters Without Public Permission--Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 
WASH. L. REV. 65 (1970). 
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public. 184 With regard to a typical inland lake, however, private 
parties may hold the entire lake perimeter, affording no public access 
to the water. 185 This private perimeter ownership excludes the public 
from enjoying lake access, despite the fact that the lakes themselves 
are owned by the public and held in trust by the state. 186 In the 
strict application of the public trust doctrine, a lake with no public 
access cannot be the object of a public trust action. 187 
Denying application of the public trust doctrine to a particular 
lake because there is currently no public access, however, would 
mean an abandonment of the public's right to use the lake in per'-
petuity. The fact that there is presently no public access does not 
justify denying the lakes this protection. The public trust doctrine 
presents a vehicle for requiring the state to protect the public's 
lakes. The purpose of the public trust doctrine is to protect the trust 
lands for all present and future uses. 188 Even where no present public 
access is available currently, trust lands should be protected for 
future generations to enjoy if and when access becomes available. 189 
If public needs demand that public trust lakes be protected despite 
a present lack of public access, then the public trust doctrine should 
apply. 190 Denying private perimeter lakes public trust protection may 
result in irreversible damage to the entire lake environment, dam-
aging the water-based ecosystem through processes such as eutro-
phication, and denying future generations the opportunity to use 
environmentally sound lakes. 191 By applying the public trust doctrine 
to private perimeter lakes, courts can assure that these lakes are 
not abused and are preserved until such time as the public can 
acquire the desired public access. 
184 Sax, supra note 127, at 477. 
185 See Canobie Lake Shores Not For General Public, supra note 18. 
185 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
187 See Sax, supra note 127, at 477. 
188 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
189 In at least two states, Maine and New Hampshire, funds are becoming available with 
which the states will purchase riparian land from private owners for the purpose of providing 
public access. The State of Maine is considering spending $15 million over five years to acquire 
riparian lands to be used to provide public access to lakes. DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 67. 
New Hampshire is also planning to spend large amounts of money to acquire riparian parcels 
of land that become available. Canobie Lake Shores Not For General Public, supra note 19. 
190 The law regarding the public use of land held in part for the benefit of the public must 
change as the public needs change. R. CLARK, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 202 (1967). 
191 Furthermore, as one commentator has noted, the old objective of obtaining the most 
widespread use of trust lands may interfere with the trust purpose of ecological preservation. 
"This conflict between democratization and preservation may require a redefinition of resource 
management goals." Comment, supra note 149, at 653 n.1l4. 
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If riparian owners cannot persuade a court to forego the public 
access requirement, these owners should consider granting a limited 
easement or dedication to the public for use of the lake. The riparian 
owners could form an association to set guidelines for public use so 
as to make the public use as unobtrusive as possible, limiting such 
variables as the number of users and hours of use. 192 These owners 
could set aside funds to administer the established guidelines. This 
option, however, could prove expensive. Alternatively, the owners 
could turn over access point management to the local municipality, 
who could be bound contractually to abide by the association-estab-
lished guidelines for use. 
Some riparian owners who wish to maintain exclusive lake access 
may reject this public access alternative. 193 Creating even a limited 
public access point may, however, satisfy the public trust doctrine's 
access requirement. 194 Furthermore, such a gesture could diffuse 
any resentment from the local public toward the current individual 
owners of lakeshore property and help marshal support in opposing 
the funnel development. Also, rather than endure funnel develop-
ment projects that would increase significantly the number of owners 
with riparian rights and dilute the current ownership's control of the 
lake, riparian owners may prefer the opportunity to regulate lake 
use. By choosing this option, the riparian owners can maintain some 
control over the increased recreational use while providing the public 
access courts may require to bring a public trust doctrine action. 
Riparian owners may have more success under the public trust 
doctrine when developers propose funnel development on smaller or 
relatively unstable lakes. 195 On large lakes, a funnel development 
project will likely have a smaller cumulative impact and therefore 
be less likely to endanger the public trust. On the smaller, more 
fragile lakes, however, even a single funnel development project can 
affect significantly a lake's condition. 196 
192 See Kusler, Carrying Controls, supra note 1, at 18. 
193 Fears of public access to the water are not unfounded. Vandalism, rowdyism, and wear 
and tear can disturb riparian owners. Such destructive activities led owners on Canobie Lake 
in New Hampshire to close their lake's only public access point. Canobie Lake Shores Not 
For General Public, supra note 19. 
194 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
195 For a discussion of a lake's carrying capacity, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
196 However, this is not to say that riparian owners on a large lake would be estopped from 
raising the public trust argument. In State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), the California court 
permitted the public trust argument despite the fact that Lake Tahoe may not have needed 
urgent public protection because ofits size. 29 Cal. 3d at 247,625 P.2d at 260, 172 Cal. Rptr. 
at 717. Any adverse impact on the public trust will suffice for a cause of action. [d. 
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Some commentators have argued that the public trust doctrine is 
unnecessary because the states, through their police powers, pre-
serve natural resources adequately.197 In many cases, the state does 
an admirable job of protecting natural resources. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that developers are constructing funnel development 
projects that will have a present and future detrimental effect on 
the trust lakes on which they are built. 198 
Riparian owners opposed to funnel development need not turn to 
the public trust doctrine where the state exercises truly protective 
police powers over the public trust lakes. These riparian owners 
need the public trust doctrine, however, where the state police 
power fails to protect these valuable resources. One recent commen-
tator criticized the doctrine as "a romantic step backward toward a 
bygone era at a time when we face modern problems that demand 
candid and honest debate on the merits, including consideration of 
current social values and the latest scientific information."199 Unfor-
tunately, the governmental bodies charged with undertaking the 
factfinding and evaluative process are all too often unable to provide 
the requisite time and knowledge, with permissive overdevelopment 
as the unfortunate result. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Funnel development projects allow a developer to capitalize on 
the expanding market for vacation homes with water access. As 
prices for waterfront parcels rise, fewer purchasers can afford single 
family lake front homes. A typical funnel development involves a 
developer who purchases a small riparian parcel and a much larger 
parcel in the backland, builds multiunit dwellings on the backlot, and 
gives each purchaser riparian rights to use the lake through the 
smaller lot's funnel. Funnel development projects enable these pur-
chasers to acquire houses with riparian access, and yield significant 
profits for developers. 
Funnel developments, however, can have significant detrimental 
effects on lakes. Funnel developments can cause serious environ-
mental degradation through increasing the intensity of recreational 
use and by introducing various pollutants to the waterway. This 
degradation can cause an irreversible decline in water quality, ac-
197 See Lazarus, supra note 130, at 674-83. 
198 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
199 Lazarus, supra note 130, at 715-16. 
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companied by declining populations of fish and wildlife. Ironically, a 
lake's beauty and health are sometimes destroyed by the commercial 
development they attract. 
The public trust doctrine represents an important common law 
argument against funnel development. By permitting funnel devel-
opment on environmentally sensitive lakes, the state violates its 
fiduciary obligation to maintain public trust lands. Riparian owners 
can invoke the public trust doctrine and shift the focus from their 
own individual injuries to the harm that states permit developers to 
inflict upon public trust lands. At a time when inadequate protection 
from development pressure permits public resource deterioration, 
the public trust doctrine will allow the courts to enforce the state's 
fiduciary obligations and protect both public and private interests in 
lake preservation. 
